We test the relationship between size of regional trade agreement (RTA) and regional trade bias using a gravity equation on a large sample of 143 countries for the period 1980-2003. We find that regional trade bias declines with the size of the club and that three of the four expanding RTAs have already surpassed their 'optimal' sizes. There is no evidence that RTAs have set protection levels against outsiders noncooperatively.
Introduction
RTAs have been a prominent feature of the world economy since the creation of the European Economic Community in the late 1950s. Two aspects of this feature are worth noting. The first is the rapid growth and complexity of these arrangements, although quite a few of them are bilateral agreements of small consequence for international trade (Pomfret, 2006, p.42 ). The second is that several plurilateral RTAs --in Europe, North America, Central America, and South East Asia--have expanded in size and economic importance. The RTA phenomenon has sparked a growing literature on the role of RTAs in the international trade system (Panagariya, 2000) .
Our paper intends to address empirically that part of the literature dealing with the relationship between RTA size and regional trade bias and the potential that it may have on trade diversion against outsiders. Our research strategy is to estimate the effects of regional trade bias and external protectionism on bilateral trade flows using the gravity equation (1): (x   ijt  ijt  2  ijt  1  ijt  4  ij  3  t  j  i  2  t  j  i  1  0  ijt where x ijt = the real bilateral trade between country i and country j at time t, y= real gross domestic product, I= real per capita income, d= distance, FEAT= a vector of dummy variables that capture idiosyncratic country characteristics, RTA= dummy variables to indicate if two trading partners belong to the same regional trade agreement, InterRTA= a dummy variable to indicate if two countries belong to different RTA, and u ijt = error term. The vector of dummy variables in FEAT includes year dummy variables and time-invariant factors such as common language, common colonizer, shared land border, and common money; see Fratianni and Kang (2006) .
The gravity equation has been derived from different models of international trade (Anderson, 1979; Deardorff, 1998 among others) and used extensively empirically (see, for example, Frankel et al., 1998; Rose, 2000; Anderson and Van Wincoop, 2003) . A trade-diverting RTA implies β 1 > 0 and β 2 < 0. As RTAs expand, assuming that external tariffs are set non-cooperatively, some of the trade occurring between blocs is diverted to trade inside the blocs (Krugman, 1991) ; this implies that β 1 becomes more positive and β 2 more negative. If external tariffs are set cooperatively, instead, both β 1 and β 2 can be positive (Krugman, 1993) ; and the sum of the two coefficients can be rising as a result of a generalized fall in protectionism. In other papers, the size of the RTA is determined endogenously. For example, in both Bond and Syropoulos (1996) and Andriamananjara (1999) , the optimal expansion of an RTA occurs short of encompassing all countries in the world. In Bond and Syropoulos, the expansion is driven by the insiders' welfare level and in Andriamananjara by the insider-firms' profits. Assuming that trade can proxy for welfare or profits, these models predict an inverted U-shaped β 1 in RTA size and a declining β 2 .
Findings
OLS estimates of (1), with fixed-year effects, are reported in Table 1 . Virtually all coefficients are statistically significant at the 1 percent significance level. Real imports respond positively to real GDP (with a unit elasticity), common border, shared culture (such as language and colonial relationship), and common institutions (such as currency); and negatively to distance. These results are in line with those reported by the literature. For the rest of the paper, we concentrate on the estimates of β 1 and β 2 . Table 1 The first column of the table shows that positive regional trade bias is present in five of the seven non-expanding RTAs: ANZCERTA and PATCRA have a negative regional trade bias. Different patterns emerge in the four expanding RTAs.
For ASEAN and CARICOM, the regional trade bias is positive but declining. The decline for ASEAN occurs when the members go from nine to ten; for CARICOM from 13 to 14. NAFTA has a negative regional bias when the membership is restricted to Canada and the United States, but then the bias becomes positive with the addition of Mexico. For the EU, the bias starts negatively and then peaks in the positive range with ten members. Thus, in three of the four expanding RTAs, the evidence is consistent with the club being too big, as seen from the viewpoint of the incumbents.
NAFTA has potential for further expansion. The migration of positive regional trade bias from old to new members holds also for ASEAN and CARICOM; the estimation is not shown but is available upon request. In ASEAN10, the regional trade bias among the old nine members, conditional on the 10 th member (Cambodia), is 241 percent and is approximately half of the bias without Cambodia. The entry of the latter into the club adds a 230 percent regional bias but its weight in the club is very small. The result is a sharp reduction in the overall trade bias of ASEAN10 with respect to ASEAN9. Similarly, in CARICOM14, the 13 old members, conditional on the 14 th member (Haiti), experience a sharp reduction in the regional bias relative to CARICOM 13; the marginal impact on the club's trade bias of Haiti, furthermore, is statistically not different from zero. Consequently, the total regional bias falls in CARICOM14 relative to CARICOM13.
The positive and statistically significant estimate of β 2 is consistent with the hypothesis that RTAs set external tariffs cooperatively. GATT, the WTO, and multilateral rounds have played a role in the global reduction of tariff rates and nontariff barriers. This result is not consistent with the view that RTAs are stumbling blocs to freer trade.
Conclusions
We have tested the relationship between RTA size and regional trade bias using a We have also evidence that RTAs have set protection levels against non-members cooperatively rather than non-cooperatively. (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) 1.2252 1.2242 CARICOM11 (1974) (1975) (1976) (1977) (1978) (1979) (1980) (1981) (1982) (1983) 3.2958 3.2964 CARICOM12 (1984) (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) 2.5867 2.5872 CARICOM13 (1996) (1997) (1998) 3.3517 3.3521 CARICOM14 (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) 1.8371 1.8373 NAFTA2 (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) -0.4288 0.4245 NAFTA3 (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) 0.7676 0.7643 EU9 (1973) (1974) (1975) (1976) (1977) (1978) (1979) (1980) -0.2119 -0.2138 EU10 (1981) (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) 0.1730 EU12 (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) 0.0219 ** EU15(1995 -2003 ) -0.0012 EU10: within EU9(1981 -1985 0.1224 EU10: EU9 & Greece(1981 -1985 0.3184 EU12: within EU10 (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) -0.0482 * EU12: EU10 & [Portugal, Spain](1986 -1994 0.1616 EU12: within Portugal and Spain(1986-1994) -0.3191 EU15: Within EU12 (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) -0.1122 EU15: EU12 & [Austria, Sweden, Finland](1995 -2003 0.1384 EU15: within Austria, Sweden, Finland(1995 -2003 0.2774
Obs. 215,500 215,500 R 2 0.6139 0.6139
Notes: Years of expansion of the RTAs are obtained from the websites of the RTAs and of the WTO. "EU10: within EU9" refers to bilateral flows among the old nine EU members; "EU10: EU9 & Greece" refers to bilateral flows between each of the nine old members and Greece. Similar reasoning applies to further expansions of the EU. All coefficients are significant at the 1% level, unless noted otherwise. * indicates that the coefficient is significant at 10% level; ** indicates that the coefficient is not significant at 10% level. All models include fixed-year effects, which are not reported.
